

# Intentional agency and temporal structures of imputation

Sebastián Figueroa Rubio

## Abstract

As a rule, the study of responsibility for actions adopts an episodic view of agency, according to which, each action is defined as a single event that breaks a norm. Furthermore, from this view, an action is intentional under a description that shows that has been caused by certain mental states. Nevertheless, our accountability practices sometimes are based on a temporally extended conception of agency to which we are responsible for a set of actions that are temporally extended and encompass a variety of events (e.g., *action libera in causa*). Moreover, we assume that some wrongs are intentional even when no mental state caused them (e.g., negligence). In this text, I examine some structures that assumes this temporally extended conception of agency and their connections to intentional action. To this end, I analyse some ideas developed by Michael Bratman on agency and by Cristina Bicchieri on how we interpret the actions of others, and I explore how these ideas can help shed light on how some legal categories operate.